Russia's war on Ukraine. 12.11.24
Operational situation
In the operational zone of the Ukrainian Operational Group of Forces (OTG) "Kharkiv" on the Kharkiv direction, Russian forces launched 8 unsuccessful assaults on Ukrainian positions in the area around Vovchansk. Kozacha Lopan suffered an airstrike.
In the "Khortytsia" Operational-Strategic Group of Forces (OSG) operational zone on the Kupyansk direction, Russian forces attacked 3 times in the areas of Kindrashivka, Novoplatonivka, and Kolisnykivka. Ukrainian Defense Forces repelled 10 enemy attacks near Hrekivka, Nevske, Terny, Novomykhailivka, and Serebrianka on the Lyman direction. Guided aerial bombs targeted Zarichne, Lyman, and Yampolivka. On the Siversk direction, the enemy attempted to push Ukrainian Defense Forces from positions near Vyimka and carried out airstrikes near Zakytne, Dronivka, and Siversk. Three enemy attempts to advance near Chasiv Yar on the Kramatorsk direction ended in failure, despite unguided rocket strikes near Novomarkove and bombing of Kramatorsk and Chasiv Yar. On the Toretsk direction, 4 assaults on Ukrainian Defense Force positions near Toretsk and Shcherbynivka were repelled.
In the "Tavriya" OSG operational zone, on the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces intensively attack Ukrainian Defense Force, launching 36 assaults. The highest concentration of Russian activity is in the areas of Myrolyubivka, Promin, Hryhorivka, Krutyi Yar, Petrivka, Pustynka, Ukrainka, and Lysivka. Myrnohrad experienced bombardment. On the Kurakhove direction, 49 combat clashes took place, with Russian forces, supported by aviation, attempting to advance near Illinka, Novoselydivka, Vozdvyzhenka, Voznesenka, Novodmytrivka, Maksymilianivka, Dalnie, Antonivka, Katerynivka, Kreminna Balka, Sontsivka, Zoria, and Kurakhove. On the Vremivka direction, the enemy increased activity, with eight enemy attacks repelled near Trudove, Makarivka, Novodaryivka, and Rivnopil. During offensive operations, the enemy extensively used aviation near Novodonetske, Maksymivka, Velyka Novosilka, and Zelene Pole. On the Orikhiv direction, Ukrainian Defense Force successfully repelled one Russian attack near Novoandriivka.
In the operational zone of "Odesa" OSG on the Prydniprovskyi direction, 5 enemy assaults failed. Additionally, the enemy launched unguided air rocket strikes on Odradokamyanka and Vesele.
General conclusion:
Russian forces maintain a high attack frequency in Kursk Oblast, launching assaults at intervals of 10-15 minutes and conducting airstrikes and rocket attacks targeting Sumy, Chernihiv, and Kharkiv Oblasts. The intensity of Russian strikes in Kursk Oblast is reported to be 2-3 times higher than on other operational directions.
In the Kupyansk direction, Russian forces have avoided using armored vehicles in assaults or near the front line for approximately a month, opting instead to deploy small infantry groups. The Russian grouping in this area includes contract soldiers, mobilized personnel, and contractors from unidentified private military companies, leading to varying levels of combat training among troops.
Russian forces are advancing at a moderate pace in western Donetsk Oblast but are unlikely to execute a rapid maneuver to encircle Ukrainian defenses near Kurakhove.
The possible elimination of the Ukrainian stronghold near Kurakhove does not signify a collapse of the frontline in Donetsk Oblast, as towns and villages further west offer strong defensive positions for Ukraine’s “Tavriya” OSG if a retreat becomes necessary.
Russia’s offensive northwest and north of Kurakhove along the Sontsivka-Voznesenka-Novoselydivka line aims to advance southwest and southward to surround “Tavriya” OSG’s stronghold north of the Kurakhove Reservoir. Additionally, Russia’s “Yug (South)” Operational Grouping attacks along the Shakhtarske-Trudove-Antonivka line to surround “Tavriya” OSG’s position south of Kurakhove. The Kurakhove Reservoir itself is a significant water obstacle that splits “Tavriya” OSG’s positions north and south of Kurakhove. An attack on the Ternivka dam by Russian forces may aim to flood villages along the Vovcha River west of the reservoir, expanding the water barrier dividing Ukrainian forces. Another goal may be to disrupt “Tavriya” OSG’s use of the H15 Donetsk-Zaporizhzhia highway.
Russian forces have increased air and missile strikes on the Kurakhove Reservoir’s dams to disrupt “Tavriya” OSG’s logistics in the area, pushing Ukrainian forces to rely on rural roads near Bahatyr. On September 18, Russian strikes on the Ternivka dam damaged the sluice control system but did not result in flooding. If successful, a long-term flood west of the reservoir could support Russia’s “Yug (South)” Operational Grouping in encircling “Tavriya” OSG’s forces north and south of Kurakhove.
On the Orikhiv direction, Russian forces may intensify attacks using armored vehicles, buggies, and motorcycles soon, following a 30-40% increase in reconnaissance activities and airstrikes over recent weeks.
In October 2024, Russia deployed over 2,000 drones against Ukraine, with up to half of these acting as decoys intended to overwhelm Ukraine's air defenses.
Regional governments in Russia allocate, on average, 13% of their budgets to one-time payments for contract servicemembers and benefits for veterans. In Stavropol Krai, 83% of social security budgets are spent on veteran benefits. Lump-sum payments for veterans and families of fallen soldiers have reached or exceeded a quarter of the total budget in 35% of all Russian regions.
Change in the line of contact (LoC):
There were 185 combat engagements on various fronts.
On the Kursk Direction, "Siversk" OTG advanced slightly on the eastern outskirts of Novoivanovka and launched attacks near Olgovka, Nikolaevo-Daryino, and Daryino.
The 810th Separate Marines Brigade of the Russian Black Sea Fleet regained lost positions northwest of Pogrebki. Russian forces moved forward on the eastern outskirts of Daryino and continued attacks near Leonidovo, Nikolaevo-Daryino, Kruglenkoe, Novoivanovka, and Malaya Loknia.
On the Kharkiv direction, Russian forces continued offensive operations around Vovchansk and Starytsia, but failed to make any progress, though they improved their positions in central Vovchansk.
On the Kupyansk direction, the 153rd Tank Regiment and 347th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 47th Tank Division from the 1st Tank Army advanced near Kolisnykivka. The enemy also moved near Petropavlivka, Berestove, and towards Lozova, conducting assaults near Kindrashivka, Zahryzove, Zelenyi Hai, and Hrekivka.
Ukrainian Defense Forces counterattacked near Vyshneve.
On the Lyman direction, Russian forces advanced in central Terny and conducted assaults near Torske and Serebrianka.
On the Siversk direction, Russian forces continued offensives around Verkhnyokamianske and Vyimka without gaining ground.
On the Kramatorsk direction, Russian forces attacked near Chasiv Yar and Stupochky.
On the Toretsk direction, Russian forces launched assaults near Toretsk, as well as near Shcherbynivka and Nelipivka.
On the Pokrovsk direction, Russian forces continued offensive actions without success, attempting to advance near Selydove, Hryhorivka, and Novooleksiivka, and attacked in the areas of Promin, Myrolyubivka, Lysivka, Sukhyi Yar, and Petrivka.
On the Kurakhove direction, Russian forces are leveraging their capture of Vuhledar to make tactical gains south of Kurakhove. They aim to encircle Kurakhove from the north and south, attempting to align the front line between Sontsivka and Shakhtarske. Currently, they are a few kilometers south of the Romanivka–Uspenivka–Sukhyi Yar line. The establishment of the “Tavriya” OSG defensive line in this area may halt enemy advances and disrupt their plans. The Russia’s “Yug (South)” Operational Grouping seeks to bypass this line to the south, advancing near Dalnie and pushing Ukrainian forces north and northeast of Vuhledar, potentially enabling further progress along the C051104 highway. This movement may allow Russian forces to apply additional pressure on Ukrainian positions in Kurakhove from the south.
On the Vremivka direction, Russian forces captured Shakhtarske and are advancing north and west of the village, progressing on the southern outskirts of Makarivka. They launched assaults near Novodaryivka, Rivnopil, and Zelenyi Pol, coordinating offensive efforts to reach Velyka Novosilka from the south and southwest.
On the Orikhiv direction, Russian forces continued offensive operations near Mala Tokmachka and Novoandriivka, but without success.
In the Black Sea-Azov naval operational area, the enemy naval group on combat duty consists of:
Mediterranean Sea: 1 ship, 1 including cruise missile carrier; the total salvo is 8 cruise missiles.
Changes in the enemy disposition:
The 51st Airborne Regiment of the 106th Airborne Division is engaged in combat operations near Daryino, in Kursk Oblast.
The 56th Separate SOF Brigade of the 51st Combined Arms Army, along with the "Rodnya" volunteer battalion (formed in Nizhny Novgorod under Z. Prilepin's leadership), operate near New York. Additionally, the “Sparta” Separate Reconnaissance Battalion of the 51st Combined Arms Army is active in Toretsk.
The 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 42nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 58th Combined Arms Army conducts operations near Robotyne. The 76th Air Assault Division is involved in combat near Novooleksandrivka.
Possible operation situation developments:
The enemy's military command in the theater of operations until March 2025 will create conditions to achieve the military-political goal of the Special Military Operation: reaching the administrative borders of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts and the junction of Zaporizhzhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Donetsk Oblasts near the village of Temyrivka.
Given the likelihood of Russian forces being redeployed from the Kupyansk and Lyman directions to the Kursk or Pokrovsk directions, the prospects for a large-scale offensive by the enemy remain unclear.
If the enemy manages to advance to the Chervone–Stupochky line on the Kramatorsk direction and simultaneously begins intensive northward attacks at the junction of its 41st and 51st Armies from the Novooleksandrivka–Arkhanhelske line, reaching the Yablunivka–Oleksandro-Kalynove line on the Toretsk direction, then the "Khortytsia" OSG will be forced to withdraw towards Kostyantynivka.
The expected sequence of enemy actions for capturing Pokrovsk is as follows: first, the 90th Tank Division of the 41st Combined Arms Army and the 27th Motorized Rifle Division of the 2nd Combined Arms Army will break through to the area south of Pokrovsk. Afterward, the main forces of the 2nd and 41st Combined Arms Armies will advance from the direction of Mykolaivka toward Myrnohrad (via Promin). Another possible maneuver could involve an advance from Hrodivka toward Novoekonomichne, with attempts to break through along the railway directly to Pokrovsk from the direction of Novohrodivka. Simultaneous operations are unlikely, as this would require allocating part of the 2nd Combined Arms Army to reinforce the 27th Motorized Rifle Division and to block or capture the Lysivka–Sukhy Yar area, weakening the “Tsentr (Center)” Operational Grouping on its main offensive line.
“Tavriya” OSG will withdraw from its positions along the Yelyzavetivka–Konstyantynopil line to avoid encirclement. A retreat from Kurakhove, which has already served its strategic purpose in this stage of the war, is to be expected. By December, the front line will likely shift 30-35 km west of its current position. By November 20, “Tavriya” OSG will pull back from the northern shore of the Kurakhove Reservoir.
After capturing Kurakhove, the forces of the enemy's "Yug (South)" Operational Grouping will focus on seizing Velyka Novosilka, which may occur in January 2025 following regrouping and replenishment of losses.
By the end of this year, the enemy will not only fail to occupy Donetsk Oblast within its administrative borders but also will be unable to seize the "fortress belt" of Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka-Kramatorsk-Slovyansk. The upcoming battle for Pokrovsk will be the climax of the enemy's offensive operation in the Southwestern Theater of Operations in 2024. October and partially November become the moment of maximum tension for both sides in the entire 2024 campaign.
Russian operational losses from 24.02.22 to 12.11.24
Personnel - almost 712,610 (+1,950);
Tanks 9,276 (+23);
Armored combat vehicles – 18,847 (+81);
Artillery systems – 20,352 (+38);
Multiple rocket launchers (MLRS) – 1,249 (+4);
Anti-aircraft warfare systems - 996 (0);
Vehicles and fuel tanks – 28,870 (+68);
Aircraft - 369 (0);
Helicopters – 329 (0);
UAV operational and tactical level – 18,737 (+61);
Intercepted cruise missiles – 2,636 (0)
Boats/ships – 29 (0).
Humanitarian + general:
At 21:00 on November 11, Russian forces struck Kharkiv using an S-300 guided missile, attacked Chernihiv Oblast with two X-59/69 guided air missiles, and dropped KAB bombs on Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Additionally, Russia launched 110 "Shahed" drones and other unidentified UAVs. As of 11:00, Ukrainian forces reported shooting down 46 of these drones, with another 60 reportedly lost in various regions of Ukraine.
In Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, rescuers recovered the bodies of three children from the rubble of a residential building hit by a Russian missile on November 11. The victims were part of one family, with a mother and her three children—boys aged 10 and 2, and a 2-month-old girl—killed in the strike.
Overnight on November 12, Russian forces launched airstrikes on residential areas in Vasylivka and Zaporizhzhia districts of Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The strikes caused significant destruction, trapping people in one of the homes. Rescuers managed to save two individuals.
Russian forces targeted the settlements of Havrylivka and Stanislav, as well as struck Zelenivka in Kherson Oblast with drones on November 12. Four civilians were injured: two men aged 77 and 70, and two women aged 54 and 86. In another shelling incident on the settlement of Veletenske, a 39-year-old man was injured.
As of 16:00 on November 12, 15 million cubic meters of water had spilled from the Kurakhove Reservoir due to Russian shelling. Fortunately, the villages along the Vovcha River remained unaffected. However, assessing the full impact of the situation has been challenging due to ongoing military threats in the area.
In Kharkiv Oblast, law enforcement agencies are investigating 12 criminal cases related to torture sites established by Russian forces. So far, 319 people have been officially recognized as victims, with 75 bodies still unidentified, most of them from a mass grave in the Izyum forest. Authorities discovered 31 sites where civilians were detained and tortured during the Russian occupation in 2022, and law enforcement has examined 27 of these sites. Other locations remain inaccessible due to active combat.
Between May 2022 and May 2023, only 8-10% of survey respondents expressed readiness for territorial concessions, with a stable majority of 82-87% opposed. However, this shifted gradually after May 2023. By the end of that year, 19% were willing to consider concessions, rising to 26% in February 2024 and to 32% in May. As of early October 2024, 32% remain open to territorial concessions, according to a survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.
The first group of volunteers joining the Ukrainian Legion in Poland has signed service contracts. The number of applications has now exceeded 600. The Ukrainian Legion consists of Ukrainian citizens living abroad. Under a bilateral agreement, Ukraine provides military uniforms and medical supplies for the volunteers, while Poland supplies infrastructure, equipment, and weapons during training.